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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs

CASE NO.

JUDY BAXTER, SQUAW PEAK, INC.,·
TOM STUBBS, FRANK HORTON and
DIANA HORTON,

17039

Defendant-Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment, granting an injunction
in favor of plaintiff-respondent Utah County, against defendant-appellant Judy Baxter, wherein defendant-appellant Baxter
was enjoined from further maintaining an eating, beer selling,
conunercial establishment on the property in question.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-appellant Judy Baxter was enjoined from maintaining an eating, beer selling, commercial establishment, in
conformity with a beer and commercial license, on the lot in
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question, by Judge J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, on the 26th day of March, 1980.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant-appellant Judy Baxter seeks a reversal and setting aside of the District Court injunction, thus allowing her
to continue to maintain the eating, beer selling, commercial
establishment, without unlawful interference from Utah County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
From 1935 until 1977, the land upon which the Riverbend
Inn was located was zoned for commercial use.

Since 1935 there

has been a commercial enterprise located there, selling beer
and food.

Several years ago, prior to 1976, defendant-

appellant Judy Baxter acquired the property and the business
of the Riverbend Lounge.
In 1976, the Utah County Commission passed a revised zoning ordinance, to go into effect in January 1977.

(T.R. 30)

That particular ordinance rezoned the property in question to
a critical environmental zone.

Under such ordinance, no com-

mercial uses were to be allowed as well as no selling of beer.
However, the county commission did allow for nonconforming
uses in said zone if they existed prior to a certain time.
In March 1953, a caretaker home for the business, the
Riverbend Lounge, was built.

(T.R. 31)

That home is also a

nonconforming use under the revised zone.

(T.R. 31,35)

(This

fact was also admitted in plaintiff's Amended Complaint.)
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On January 17, 1978 (misstated as 1977 in trial), the
business known as the Riverbend Lounge was destroyed by fire.
(T.R. 34,42)

Mrs. Iva Snell, the head of the Department for

Building Inspection and Zoning Enforcement and Business Regulation for Utah County (T.R. 25), at the time of the fire, informed defendant-appellant Judy Baxter, hereinafter referred
to as defendant-appellant, that according to the zoning
ordinances of Utah County, there had to be a structural remodel or replacement within 12 months of the destruction.
(T.R. 48)
In compliance with the above, defendant-appellant went
to Ron Parker, an employee of the county, employed in the
Building Inspection and Zoning Enforcement (T.R. 33,34) on
November 15, 1978 and applied for a building permit to remodel
the caretaker home.

Mr. Parker filled out the building permit

and defendant-appellant apprised him of the fact that she was
going to sell beer from the caretaker home, remodeled into a
lounge.

(T.R. 45)

Mrs. Snell and Mr. Parker both knew that

the purpose for the remodeling was a conunercial establishment
to sell beer.

(T.R. 45, 51, 55 and 57)

Ron Parker and Iva Snell were informed by defendantappellant that she had spent $3,500 to $4,000 to remodel the
caretaker house, at the time of the building permit application.

(T.R. 46)
In mid December 1978, with the remodeling complete,

defendant appellant paid $312 to Utah County for a beer

-3-
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license renewal, which amount the county accepted.
47)

(T.R. 39,

The former beer license was still in effect at the time

of the above renewal.

(T.R. 49)

Finally, on July 30, 1979, plaintiff-respondent returned
defendant-appellant's check for $312 to her and told her at the
time, some seven months later, that they were denying defendantappellant her beer license; consequently, according to them,
defendant-appellant could no longer sell beer.

Then, on or

about November 7, 1979, the plaintiff-respondent finally filed
an action to close defendant-appellant down entirely, including her commercial and beer license.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
REFUSING TO DENY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
In the plaintiff's amended complaint, it was alleged
that "defendant's continued failure and refusal to cease and
desist from such violation will result in irreparable harm to
Utah County . . . "

In paragraph 11 of that same complaint,

plaintiff-respondent stated that the continued violation of
a county ordinance was detrimental to the County of Utah and
its inhabitants in that it"frustrates the comprehensive plan
for the development of the county . . . "

At no time during

the trial was any evidence elicited or put forth by plaintiffrespondent to in any way reflect that the plaintiff had suffered irreparable injury or harm because of their allegation
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that defendant-appellant had failed and refused to cease and
desist from an alleged violation of the zoning ordinance.
Further, plaintiff never attempted to put on any evidence
that any alleged violation of the county zoning ordinance was
detrimental to Utah County nor was there evidence produced by
plaintiff that such an alleged violation-frustrated any comprehensive plan.

It is such a basic and fundamental rule of

law that the evidence deduced at trial must conform to the
pleadings and that those matters plead must be proven at trial
in order for plaintiff to receive the relief for which he prays,
that to cite authority for that proposition would almost be redundant.

Further, as will be shown in the other arguments con-

tained in this brief, it is absolutely essential and necessary
in order for a plaintiff to obtain an injunction that plaintiff
must plead and prove irreparable injury and harm to themselves.
Since the granting of an injunction usually takes away the
property rights of a defendant, the pleading and proving of
irreparable injury is even more compelling.

Otherwise, defen-

dant would be deprived of constitutional rights guaranteed to
her.
Henson v. Payne, 302 S.W.2d 44,51 (Mo. 1956), was a suit
for an injunction to restrain a defendant religious faction
from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession of church
property by attempting to construct a building on the church
premises.

Since plaintiffs did not prevail at the trial level,

they filed an after-trial motion to amend the judgment, which

-5-
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motion included among other things that "the judgment entered
is contrary to all of the evidence adduced . .

n

The Supreme

Court of Missouri, in answer to that argument stated in part
that "the decree must conform not only to the evidence but to
the pleadings."

(Emphasis added)

In the instant case, the

decree rendered by the trial court did not conform to the
pleadings, especially to paragraphs 11 and 12.
the trial record, the court stated,
rests?"

At page 53 of

"All right, then the county

The county replied, "Yes, Your Honor."

At that time

counsel for defendant-appellant moved the court to dismiss the
complaint on file and then additionally stated that "I don't
think the county has shown any detriment to the county."
upon, the court queried,

Where-

"Do they have to?", to which counsel

for defendant-appellant replied, "Well, they plead it."

To

that the court replied, "As a matter of fact, I've precluded
it."

(T.R. 53,54)

Since plaintiff-respondent did not attempt

to;nor offer any evidence whatsoever dealing with irreparable
injury to the county even though they had plead the same, and
the judge held that they did not have to, because he had precluded it, the decree entered by the trial court did not conform to paragraphs 11 or 12 of the pleadings filed plaintiff.
In Haiku Plantations Association

v. Lono, 529 P.2d 1,3

(Haw. 1974), an action was conunenced by plaintiffs who were
the owner-lesses of a subdivision wherein they sought to enjoin the owner of an easement from parking vehicles in and
around their subdivision.

There, the court stated, "All of
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the material allegations of the complaint in the absence of an
answer thereto, must be deemed to have been denied by [the defendant] and therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs
to prove each of these allegations by the requisite proof to
be entitled to any injunctive relief."

In the instant case,

all of the material allegations of the amended complaint were
denied specifically by defendant-appellant and therefore in
order for the plaintiff to prevail, it had the burden to prove
each of the allegations contained in their amended complaint.
Since the court did not require them to do so, reversible error
was committed and injunction should not have issued.
In Pugmire v. Oregon Shortline R. Company, 92 P. 762,767
(Utah 1907), the court was confronted by a situation which was
in reverse to the one in the instant case, but which would be
applicable to the case above.

There the court stated:

"[T]he plaintiff should have been limited in
her proof to the injuries alleged in her complaint. This was not done. Permitting the
plaintiff to introduce the evidence objected
to naturally tended to take the defendant by
surprise and to prove an element of damages
of which it had no notice."
As this applies to the instant case, the defendant-appellant
was put on notice by plaintiff's amended complaint, that plaintiff intended to prove irreparable injury and harm to the county
as well as frustration of a comprehensive zoning plan, which
would be detrimental to Utah County.

Therefore, since plain-

tiff did not have to prove the detriment to Utah County because
of the frustration of the comprehensive plan; nor more impor-
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tantly, since they did not have to prove irreparable injury in
order to obtain an injunction, defendant was taken by surprise
and had no advance notice.

Such surprise and lack of notice

really deprived defendant-appellant of her rights of due process.
In Sinclair Refining Company v.. Wyatt, 149 S. W. 2d 353, 355
(Mo. 1941), it was stated, "In an equity case, the decree must
conform not only to the evidence but also to the pleadings."
Finally, in Friedel v. Bailey, 44 S.W.2d 9,15 (Mo. 1931),
it was held that "this court is limited to the issues contained
in the pleadings.

The decree must conform not only to the evi-

dence but also to the pleadings."
Therefore, as is stated in the above-cited cases, it is
absolutely essential that the decree in the instant case conform to the pleadings.

Since the decree entered by the trial

court, did not conform to paragraphs 11 or 12 of plaintiffrespondent' s amended complaint and a fortiori, since an essential element to the obtaining of an injunction, is to plead
and prove irreparable injury, such a failure on the part of
the trial court to have the decree conform to the pleadings
should result in reversible error.

Therefore, plaintiffs-

respondents are not entitled in any way to have an injunction
issued against defendant-appellant.
Further, by pleading irreparable injury and harm, plaintiffs put defendants on notice that they were prepared to
prove that at the time of trial.

It is logical to assume,
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therefore, that defendant-appellant would naturally prepare to
meet that argument of irreparable injury,

Since the trial

court did not require plaintiffs to prove such, defendantappellant would not have been prepared to meet such a turn of
events at the trial court level.

Consequently, there is a com-

pelling due process denial since defendant-appellant was taken
by surprise.
Finally, the following two cases should be brought to this
court's attention.

In La

Bellman~

Gleason & Saunders, Inc.,

418 P.2d 949 (Okla. 1966), the court stated:
"Jurisdiction of the trial court is limited
to the particular subject matter presented by
the pleadings, and any judgment which is beyond
the issues framed by the pleadings and proof
is in excess of the court's jurisdiction and
is void."
Secondly, a somewhat recent pronouncement by our own
court is stated in Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976):
"While the rules countenance liberality and procedure in the
granting of relief to which a party is shown to be entitled,
this does not go so far as to authorize granting relief on
issues neither raised nor tried."
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE BUSINESS
TO THE HOME ENLARGED THE NONCONFORMING USE.
The facts which are pertinent to this argument are that
the nonconforming use, prior to its destruction, was between
6,000 and 8,000 square feet in size.

-9-

(T.R. 48)

The original
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nonconforming use was used as an eating establishment and a
place where beer was dispensed.

(T.R. 35,36)

After the de-

struction of the nonconforming use, defendant-appellant transferred the business, which was an eating establishment and a
beer dispensing business, to a home located several feet from
the site of the original nonconforming use, the square footage
of said home being 850 square feet.

(T.R. 36)

In other words,

defendant-appellant maintained exactly the same type of business as she had in the nonconfo·rming use prior to its destruction when she transferred that business to the house.

The only

difference being that the house was comprised of less square
footage, by approximately six to eight times less, than that
of the original nonconforming use.

Defendant-appellant did not

in any way change the nature or character of her business by
making such a move and did not enlarge said business.

She was

compelled to move the business to the only structure on that
parcel of ground in order to maintain her beer license and keep
it active, in order that said beer license could be renewed.
Further, it was brought out at trial by the county's witness, Iva Snell, that the home to which the business was transferred was originally built and used as a caretaker home for
the nonconforming use, prior to its destruction.

(T.R. 31)

As if to underscore that, Mrs. Snell was asked whether or not
the caretaker home for the business was located there and to
which she repliedtyes'!

In other words, the home would never

have been built if there had never been a business on that
-10-
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parcel of ground.

The home was there solely for the purpose of

the business and as will be further amplified below, that fact
is critical.
It was also brought out at trial that the business which
was destroyed was a nonconforming use and that the home, located on the property, was also a nonconforming use to the zone in
which the property was located.

These facts were also admitted

in plaintiff-respondent's amended complaint.
In City of Silisbee 5 Herron, 484 S.W.2d 154,156,157
(Civ.App.Tex. 1972), the court set forth certain tests as to
whether a nonconforming use is valid.

One test used is whether

or not the use is the same before and after the zoning restriction becomes effective.

The court also stated that "certain

construction changes or increases have been permitted where
the basic use is not changed."

Finally, the court stated, "Per-

haps the most understandable and easily applied test is that an
existing use should mean the utilization of the premises so
that they may be known in the neighborhood as being employed
for a given purpose.

11

Applying this to the instant case even

though the issue is not the establishment of a nonconforming
use, is that defendant-appellant used the original nonconforming use to sell food and beer.

After the destruction of the

original nonconforming use and the transfer of the business to
the 850 square foot house, the use was to sell food and beer.
The basic use never did change.

Applying the last test, above

stated, the original nonconforming use was known in the neigh-

-11-
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borhood as a place for the sale of food and beer.

After that

business was transferred to the home, the use was still known
in the neighborhood as being a place for the sale of food and
beer.

The only thing that had changed after the destruction

of the original nonconforming use, was the site of the business--it had moved several feet to the east of the original
nonconforming use.

Even so, the transferred business was still

the same type of business except that it was now established
on a smaller scale, which was necessitated by the small scale
of the remodeled home, which became a lounge.

The neighborhood

still knew that it was a place where food and beer could be
purchased.
In Zoning Board of Adjustment v. Lawrence, 309 S.W.2d 883,
884,886 {Civ.App.Tex. 1958), it was found that the entire tract
was used as a veterinary clinic at the time of the enactment
of the zoning ordinance which did not permit such use.

It was

also found that Lawrence had moved one building 150 feet and
joined that to another building at the cost of $15,000.

Even

though the zoning ordinance in question spoke in terms of a
structural alteration when applied to a nonconforming use the
court found that the nonconforming use could be continued, even
in light of the above facts since no structural alterations
were made.

That case is analogous to the case at bar.

Defen-

dant-appellant used all of the parcel of land, where the original nonconforming use was lo'cated, as part of the business
of selling food and dispensing beer.

-12-

The land around the
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original nonconforming use was used for parking and the home
located just east of the original nonconforming use was put
there solely as a caretaker home for the business.

Had the

business not been there, the home would not have been built as
a caretaker home for the business; therefore, the entire tract
was used for the purposes of maintaining the business.

In

view of Lawrence, supra, the fact that defendant-appellant
moved the business from its original situs to the remodeled
home, now lounge, does not mean that defendant-appellant surcharged the original nonconforming use, even though said use
was established in a different location on the tract of land.
In City of Wichita Falls v, Evans, 410 S.W.2d 311,313
(Civ.App.Tex. 1967), the court was confronted with the fact
that the building from which the business had been transacted
was originally a small structure so located on the tract that
there was room to construct a new building thereon without removing the old.

Evans erected a new building and then took

the stock of goods from the old structure and placed them into
the new structure and continued the business from the new structure.

Then the old building was renewed.

The situs of the

new building was approximately one foot from the site of the
old, but was placed on a new foundation.

The applicable zon-

ing ordinance spoke in terms of conducting a business from the
"same location."

Therefore, the court had to construe the

meaning of "same location" to see whether or not the abovementioned change conformed to the ordinance.

The court held
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that even though a change had been made, the business was still
being conducted from the same location.
That case is appositeto the case at bar, especially since
the facts are similar.

The remodeled home, now lounge, was

located only a few feet from the site of the original nonconforming use and the same or similar stock of goods being sold
in the destroyed nonconforming use were sold in the newly remodeled lounge.

In other words, the nature of the business had

not changed even though the location had, a minimal amount.
The Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County states in part,
"Nevertheless, a nonconforming building or structure of use of
land may be continued to the same extent and character as that
which legally existed on the effective day of the applicable
regulations."

The ordinance in addressing itself to a damaged

or destroyed nonconforming building or structure states in
part, "[S]uch restoration shall not increase the floor space
devoted to the nonconforming use over that which existed at the
time the

buildin~

became nonconforming."

The ordinance does

not address itself to the question of whether or not the restored nonconforming use has to be located on the exact site of
the destroyed nonconforming use.

Also, in the case at bar, the

floor space devoted to the restored nonconforming use was not
anywhere near 6,000 to 8,000 square feet as was contained in
the destroyed nonconforming use.

In fact, as has already been

mentioned, the floor space of the restored nonconforming use
was only 850 square feet.

Yet the plaintiff-respondent would
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have the trial court and this court believe that such a ~rans
fer to a nonconforming building which was less than one-sixth
of the original floor space of the destroyed nonconforming use,
was a change in the extent and character of the original nonconforming use.

Such a view is preposterous.

In fact, Mr.

Burningham, a deputy Utah county attorney, stated to the court
that "we have other reason [sic] for getting her stopped."
(T.R. 65)

This shows that the plaintiff was not really inter-

ested in whether or not defendant-appellant had in any way.
changed the extent and character of the prior nonconforming
use.
Since defendant-appellant had a prior nonconforming use
which was· destroyed and transferred that same use to a location, smaller in size than the original and on the same parcel
of ground and dispensing the same products, she necessarily
had a vested right in that nonconforming use.

To divest her

of that right, without any proof whatsoever on the part of
plaintiff that the extent and character of the prior nonconforming use had changed is to deny defendant-appellant of her
property without due process of law, as is guaranteed to her
by the constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United

States.

Kensmoe v. City of Missoula, 480 P.2d 835,838

{Mont. 1971).
Gibbons & Reed Co. v, North Salt Lake City, 19 Ut.2d 329,
431 P.2d 559,564 (1967), dealt with land owners who desired to
use their property for sand and gravel excavation.

-15-
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Lake City tried to enforce two of its zoning ordinances and
one excavation ordinance in order to compel the discontinuance
of the use of plaintiff's property for sand and gravel operations.

The court was called upon to determine the validity of

the provisions of the ordinances as applied to plaintiff's operations on the property.

Even though this case deals with

the excavation of gravel, which is somewhat different from the
facts in the case at bar, the logic used therein, would be applicable to the case at hand.

There, this court ruled that be-

cause of the very nature and use of an extraction business
that the entire tract "is generally regarded as within the
exemption of an existing nonconforming use, although the entire tract is not so used at the time of the passage or ef fecti ve date of the zoning ordinance."

Drawing an analogy to the

instant case, it can be argued that even though the entire parcel or tract of land wherein the destroyed nonconforming use
is located either directly or indirectly was used for the enhancement of defendant-appellant's business operation, the use
of a different location, within the same tract and not many
feet from the original destroyed nonconforming use, would in
no way change the extent and character of the destroyed nonconforming use.
The facts show that defendant-appellant planned to sell
food and beer from the 850 square foot remodeled lounge just
as she had so done with the destroyed nonconforming use.
fact that the remodeled lounge used to be a home does not
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The

really change the extent and character of the destroyed nonconforming use.

She still dispensed the same items to the

public, the people surrounding the area knew that the destroyed
nonconforming use was a place in which to purchase food and
beer and that the same could be purchased from the smaller
remodeled lounge.

It would be an entirely different case if

defendant-appellant had tried to use that parcel of ground in
a manner totally unrelated to the items dispensed from the
prior nonconforming use.

That never happened--the only thing

different was that a home had been remodeled into a lounge,
the lounge is only 850 square feet and that lounge is located
several feet to the east of the original nonconforming use.
Since the ordinance does not require that any restorations
must be built on the same situs of the prior nonconforming
use, it is submitted that a move to a slightly different location on the property, but still dispensing food and beer, is
not a change in extent and character.

In fact, defendant-

appellant' s restored operation was on a much smaller scale,
born out of necessity of having to locate in a smaller building.

Such fact demonstrates that she conformed to the require-

ments contained in the Utah County ordinance dealing with nonconforming buildings and uses.

Such ordinance is appended to

this brief as Appendix No. 1.
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III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING
PLAINTIFF TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND HARM AND
ALSO ERRED BY GRANTING AN INJUNCTION WITHOUT REQUIRING PLAINTIFF
TO PROVE THE SAME.
At the time plaintiff closed their case in chief, nowhere
in that case did they present any evidence whatsoever that by
allowing defendant to continue her business operation would result in irreparable injury and harm to plaintiff, Utah County.
Yet, in spite of that fact, plaintiff was in court to seek a
permanent injunction against defendant's operation of a beer
and eating establishment on that property.

As is stated in

42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions §48, "The very function of an injunction is to furnish preventive relief against irreparable mischief or injury .

The mere assertion that apprehended

acts will inflict irreparable injury is not enough.

The com-

plaining party must allege and prove facts from which the
court can reasonably infer that such would be the resttlt."
(Emphasis added)

The fact that no injunction can be granted

unless there is a showing of irreparable injury or harm is a
well grounded and fundamental rule of law.

Because the trial

court failed to dismiss plaintiff's complaint at the close of
their case in chief because they did not offer any evidence
whatsoever to support a showing of irreparable injury the
court very erroneously granted the injunction to close down
defendant's eating and beer selling business.
In Jivelekas

~City

of Worland, 546 P.2d 419,423 (Wyo.
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1976), plaintiffs sued the City of Worland for damages caused
to their home by a sewer backup, alleging that defendant was
negligent in the planning, construction and maintenance of its
sewer line.

Plaintiffs wanted injunctive relief to compel the

city "to take necessary steps to replace the sewer line."

The

court held:
"Since there is no liability, there can, of
course, be no injunctive relief.
Before injunctive relief will be granted the thing
complained of must have caused actual injury
and the cause must be orove-iand identified . .
'It must be a material-and actual injury,
existing or presently threatened, and not
one that is fanciful, theoretical, or merely
possible, or that is doubtful, eventual, or
contingent.'"
In the case at bar, no proof was submitted to the court by
plaintiff that there

w~s

a material or actual injury whether

presently existing or threatened.

The court, therefore, cannot

grant an injunction because any injury alleged by the county
is fanciful, theoretical or merely possible.

In fact plain-

tiff could not in any way show any irreparable injury or harm
to themselves which would be different from any, if at all,
deriving from the business venture of the prior nonconforming
use, even if it had not been destroyed.

Plaintiffs could com-

plain that the irreparable injury they suffered was a frustration of the comprehensive plan for the development of the county
as set forth in the applicable zoning ordinance.

Yet nowhere

in the trial did plaintiff present any evidence as to the comprehensive plan for the development of the county nor was any
evidence deduced by plaintiff as to any frustration of the comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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prehensive plan.

In fact, plaintiffs would be hard pressed to

show that the restored nonconforming use frustrated the comprehensive plan for the development of Utah County any more so
than the original destroyed nonconforming use had that business
not been destroyed.

However, such an argument is inapplicable

since plaintiffs did not in any way put forth any evidence to
support that allegation.
In Venegas v. United Farm Workers Union, 15 Wash.App. 858
552 P.2d 210 (1976), tenants of a labor camp brought a claim
for injunctive relief against a labor union, which the court
denied, stating:
"Tenants of the labor camp have failed to make
a clear showing of necessity for injunctive
relief against continuing organizational activities by the UFW. Therefore, the court had no
duty to issue the injunction. Absent irreparable injury, there is no abuse of discretion in
the denial of injunctive relief."
In the case at bar, plaintiffs have failed to make a clear
showing of necessity for injunctive relief against defendant
for the continual operation of her business out of the remodeled
lounge.

Therefore, the trial court below, had no duty in fact
1

was in clear error to issue the injunction to close down defendant-appellant.

Not only did plaintiff fail to show any

necessity for the injunctive relief, as was before stated, they
failed to show irreparable injury.

In Henson, supra, the court

denied plaintiff's request for an injunction because the evidence did not show irreparable damage to plaintiffs.

The

court also held:
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"It is the purpose of an injunction to restrain
actual or threatened acts which constitute a
real injury and is to be used sparingly in
clear cases only, and the decree should be so
framed as to afford the relief to which complaintant is entitled, and not to interfere
with legitimate and proper action on part of
those against whom it is directed."
As was before stated, there was never any showing on the
part of plaintiff or the evidence deduced at the trial that
plaintiff had suffered any real injury.

In Berryman

~

Inter-

national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 416 P.2d 387,388,
389 (Nev. 1966), the court held that "injunctive relief is not
available in the absence of actual or threatened injury, loss
or damage.

There should exist the reasonable probability that

real injury will occur if the injunction does not issue."

The

court in that case, denied the injunction since plaintiffs had
incurred no damage or injury, actual or threatened.
As concerning the instant case, no reasonable probability
that real injury would occur to the county if defendant-appellant continued in her business venture, was cited.
Again, in Agronic Corporation of America

~

deBaugh, 21

Wash.App. 459, 585 P.2d 821,824 (1978), the court held that
the "essential elements which must be shown before an injunction will be granted are necessity and irreparable injury."
Amplifying that, the court stated:
"A party seeking an injunction must 'show a
clear legal or equitable right and a wellgrounded fear of immediate invasion of that
right.' Furthermore, the acts complained of
must establish an actual and substantial injury or an affirmative prospect thereof to
the complainant . . . . "
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The purpose of an injunction is not
to punish a wrongdoer for past actions but
to protect a party from present or future
wrongful acts. A court should not issue an
injunction when the harm it will do to a
defendant is disproportionate to the damage
caused a plaintiff by the action he asks
be injoined."
In the case at bar, plaintiff did not in any way show any
essential elements prior to the granting of an injunction in
his behalf.

Nowhere in the evidence, considered in plaintiff's

case in chief, was there anything dealing with the necessity of
an injunction or irreparable injury done to plaintiff.

Yet,

the trial court granted an injunction which granting, runs
counter to the well-established rules of law regarding the
elements which must be shown before an injunction will be
granted.

Further, plaintiff failed to show a clear legal or

equitable right and also failed to show a well-grounded fear
of irrunediate invasion of that right.

In addition, plaintiff's

proof was void of any actual or substantial injury

or even

an affirmative prospect of any kind of actual and substantial
injury.

Nowhere did plaintiff seek to protect the county from

any present or future wrongful acts of defendant.

In accord

is KAKE-TV and Radio Inc. v. City of Wichita, 516 P.2d 929,935
(Kan . 19 7 3 } .
There have been several pronouncements by the Supreme
Court of this date regarding the necessary elements to be
proven in order that an injunction will be granted.
case is Intermountain Electronics, Inc.
trict, 14 Utah2d 86, 377

~

Such a

Tintic School Dis-

P.2d 783,785 (1963).

There, plain-
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tiff, who was engaged in the field of cable television, had
been granted a franchise to operate a TV system in the town
of Eureka.

The defendant's school district, acting under the

authority of a Utah statute, contracted with a company to install, on a high peak in Juab County, a television translator
which would receive, amplify and rebroadcast signals from originating television stations, making the signals available to
people in the surrounding area.

Action was commenced by Inter-

mountain Electronics to restrain the installation of the translater station, it being alleged that plaintiff had made a substantial investment in installing its special TV system; that
it had an exclusive franchise in Eureka and numerous contracts
with local subscribers and that valuable property rights would
be destroyed and irreparable injury would ensue if the plan of
the defendants was carried out.
pressed.

The Utah court was not im-

It ruled:

"The fundamental question is whether the plaintiff asserts a valid basis for prohibiting
the defendants from proceeding with the proposed project.
To justify doing so, it is
not sufficient that plaintiff claim irreparable injury to its property, but there must be
some actual or threatened violation of its
rights by a wrongful act of the defendants."
This honorable court also cited with approval Jackson
Harward, 9 Utah2d

136,137, 339 P.2d 1026 (1959).

v.

The long

standing law, in the state of Utah, is that not only is it
not sufficient that plaintiff claim irreparable injury to its
property, but there must also be a showing of some actual or
threatened violation of its rights by a wrongful act of the
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defendant.

As has been stated many times in this brief, in

the instant case, plaintiff at the time of trail never did
claim nor prove any irreparable injury, a fortiori, they did
not even show any actual or threatened violation of their
rights by any wrongful acts on the part of defendant-appellant.
Therefore, an injunction should never have been granted by the
trial court and by its granting, the trial court committed an
eg·regious error.
That rule, extrapolated by the Supreme Court of this
state, is further amplified in Crescent Mining Co. v Silver
King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 P. 244,248 (1898).

The court

stated:
"The power to grant injunctions to prevent injustice has always been regarded as peculiar
and extraordinary. It is not controlled by
ordinary and technical rules, but the application for its exercise is addressed to the conscience and sound discretion of the court.
Ordinarily, it will not be exercised when the
v/right of the complainzant is doubtful, and has
not been settled at law~ and, even when it has
been so settled, an injunction will not be
granted when the remedy at law is adequate.
It is not enough that an injury merely nominally or theoretically is apprehended, even
although an action at law might be maintained
for it; but, to justify the interposition of
this summary power, there must be cause to
fear substantial and serious damage, for which
courts of law could furnish no adequate remedy."
(Emphasis added)
In accord, is Gulf, C.&S.F.RY.Co. v White, 281 S.W.2d
441 (Civ.App.Tex. 1955).

Also, Gibbons & Reed, supra.

As has been amply shown, not only by the Supreme Court of
this state, but by authority from other jurisdictions, the

-24-
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granting of the injunction against defendant-appellant, Judy
Baxter, was clearly erroneous absent any showing of necessity
and irreparable injury on the part of plaintiff.
B

THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO
BALANCE THE CONVENIENCES PRIOR
TO GRANTING THE INJUNCTION IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.
By their very nature, equity courts should always be
solicitous to work out the equities and justice of the case
before them.
"Generally, courts are not bound to make a
decree that will do more mischief and work
greater injury that a wrong which is asked
to redress.
Thus, if the circumstances are
such that the injunction would bear heavily
on the defendant without benefitting the
plaintiff, it will usually be refused, as
where the inconvenience and injury to the
plaintiff are not of a pressing character,
and the result would be to cause a large
loss to defendant." 42 Am Jur 2d Injunctions,
§56.
As was before stated, defense counsel, at the close of
plaintiff's case in chief, moved the court to dismiss plaintiff's action since plaintiff had failed to prove any irreparable injury.

Since the court failed to grant said motion to

dismiss, the court never inquired into the onerous burden to
be born by defendant while comparing the benefits of the injunction to the plaintiff; hence, it committed reversible
error.

The above-cited rule from Am Jur 2d is in accord with

the decision reached in Huggins v.Wake County Board of Education, 272 N.C. 33, 157 S.E.2d 703,709 (1967).

Also, Barber
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~School

District, 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.Ct.App. 1960).

In the

instant case, since plaintiffs did not prove any irreparable
injury to themselves if defendant continued in her business,
then certainly the fact that the injunction closed down defendant, deprived her of a property right and destroyed her means
of livelihood certainly displays the fact that the injunction
weighs very heavily on defendant and in no way is beneficial
to the plaintiff, since it really does not make any difference
whether defendant engages in this business in the original nonconforming use and now in the replaced nonconforming use.

In

other words, plaintiff is not affected by the continuation of
defendant's business, whether it be the original nonconforming
use or the reconstructed nonconforming use.
This rule of "balancing conveniences" is· a well-established and fundamental rule of law.

In

Grey~

Mayor, etc.,

of City of Paterson, 60 N.J.E. 385,45 A.995,998 (1900), the
court held:
"' [T]hat an injunction ought not to be granted
when the benefits secured by it to one party
is of little importance, while it will operate oppressively and to the great annoyance
and injury of the other party, unless the
wrong complained of is so wanton and unprovoked in its character as properly to deprive
the wrongdoer of the benefit of any consideration as to its injurious consequences, 1 • • •
In the case before us, the injury to the defendants would be so great that an injunction
should not be granted to these complaintants."
In the instant case, the benefit to be secured by the
plaintiff by obtaining the injunction is of so little importance

-26-
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to them, that they never even bother to put on any proof as
to any irreparable injury suffered by them if the injunction
would not have been issued.

On the other hand, the injunction

has operated and will continue to operate so oppressively and
so injuriously to defendant, that there is a high likelihood
that the defendant will have to suffer bankruptcy.

The opera-

tion of the business was the defendant's only real means of
livelihood and since she has been deprived of that means of
livelihood, plaintiff has realized very little benefit.

As

was before stated, plaintiff's injury, if at all, is extremely
incidental and so comparatively small that they did not even
bother to ascertain what the injury would be.
The precedent.of this jursidiction is in accord with the
above-cited authority.

In Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King

Mining Co., 17 Utah, 444, supra, the court held, "If the
granting of an injunction would necessarily cause great loss
to the defendant,--a loss altogether disproportionate to the
injury sustained by the plaintiff,--that fact should be considered in determining whether the application should be
granted; and in some cases it would justly have great weight."
In Gibbons and Reed, supra, the court would not grant an
injunction in favor of North Salt Lake City.

Part of the con-

sideration in arriving at that decision, was the fact that
"the record indicates that the fair market value of plaintiff's
property would be reduced from almost $86,000 to approximately
$39,000.

In addition to that, the plaintiff would be unable
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to utilize sand and gravel deposits of a value approximating
one million dollars."

Applying that reasoning to the case at

hand, if defendant were unable to utilize the parcel of land
in question, for the sale of beer or food or for any other
commercial activity, the value of that parcel would drop substantially.

This is another consideration which the trial

court failed to take into account in granting plaintiff the
injunction plaintiff sought.

In accord is Agronic, supra.
IV

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANTAPPELLANT SINCE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPEED_~·FROM
REVOKING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S
BEER LICENSE AND COMMERCIAL
LICENSE AND FROM SEEKING THE INJUNCTION FOR WHICH THEY PRAYED.
Due to the conduct of plaintiff-respondent directed towards defendant-appellant at the time that defendant-appellant
applied to Utah County for a building permit and paid the requisite sum as well as in December 1978, wherein defendant
paid to the county the sum of $312 for the beer license (T.R.
38) , plaintiff should have been estopped from revoking defendant's beer license and from seeking the injunction which was
granted to them by the trial court.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comrnmission,
602 P.2d ·689,690,694,695 (1979), involved a situation where
the Liquor Control Conunission represented to the liquor license
applicant that the applicant's plot plan complied with the
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statute prohibiting the issuance of such licenses to clubs
located within a radius of 600 feet of any public or private
school, and applicant, in reliance upon such representation,
thereafter expended upwards of $200,000 to complete the construction of the club.

The court there, held that the Liquor

Control Commission was estopped from denying the license on
the ground that the applicant's facilities did not comply with
the 600-foot requirement.

In reaching that decision, the

court enumerated the elements which are essential to invoke
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

These elements are set

forth as follows:
"l.

An admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted,

2.

Action by the other party on the faith of
such admission, statement, or act, and

3.

Injury to such other party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such admission, statement, or act."

In Celebrity, supra, the agents of the commission advised
the owners of the club as to the appropriate alterations to the
premises which the petitioner followed.
In dealing with this doctrine of equitable estoppel, the
court went on to state:
"The conduct of government should always be
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens; and where a public official, acting
within his authority and with knowledge of
the pertinent facts, has made a commitment
and the party to whom it was made has acted
to his detriment in reliance on that commitment, the official should not be permitted
to revoke that commitment."
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Amplifying the above ruling, 42 Arn Jur 2d, Injunctions
§61, states as follows:
"Remedy by way of injunction will not generally
be granted in favor of one who, with full knowledge of what is being done or with means of
acquiring such knowledge, is acquiescent or
delays in asserting, or neglects to assert, his
rights until defendant has placed himself in a
position from which he is unable to extricate
himself without great injury or damage."
(Emphasis added)
In the instant case, the facts indicate that the· doctrine
of equitable estoppel is applicable.

During the trial, plain-

tiff called Iva Snell to the witness stand.

When asked what

her occupation was, Miss Snell replied that she was the head
of the Department for Building Inspection and Zoning Enforcernent and Business Regulation for Utah County.

Then in answer

to the question propounded to her by plaintiff as to what her
duties were, she replied that part of her duties were to "make
sure that permits that are issued comply with the zoning ordinance."

In effect, Miss Snell, as an agent of the county, had

the authority to advise applicants as to whether or not by way
of their application they were in compliance with the zoning
ordinances of Utah County.

Even though much was stated by

plaintiff that defendant Baxter, in making the application for
a building permit, referred to that building as a single family
home, Miss Snell admitted that Ron Parker, who is also an agent
of the county and also worked in her department, as well as
taking defendant Baxter's application for the building permit,
that Mr. Parker knew what the purpose of the single family
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dwelling was, i.e., that it was to be used as a loungz from
which beer and food would be dispensed.

(T.R. 57)

Miss Snell

also admitted that Mr. Parker told her this and that they had
a discussion regarding that, at a time almost contemporaneous
to the issuance of the building permit and accepting the $312
from defendant Baxter for the renewal of the beer license.

In

fact, defendant Baxter testified that she told Ron Parker, the
above-referred to agent of Utah County, that her purpose in
remodeling the single family residence was so that it could be
modified to the point that it would become a lounge from which
beer and food would be dispensed.

Also, that the closets which

were marked as such on the plans submitted to him should have
been marked as coolers.

{T.R. 45)

When cross-examined by counsel for defendant, Baxter, Miss
Snell stated that she could have been present at the time when
defendant Baxter walked into the off ice to apply for and obtain
the building permit.

(T.R. 33)

As was before stated, Miss

Snell admitted that Mr. Parker knew what the purpose of the
single family residence was, and that she was apprised by Mr.
Parker what that purpose was, i.e., that it was to be used as
a lounge to dispense beer and food.

{T.R. 57)

As a result of

the building permit application, said building permit was
issued to

defenda~t

Judy Baxter on November 15, 1978.

The

issuance of such permit was inconsistent with later denying
defendant the ability to so operate the lounge, especially to
sell beer; in light of the fact that Miss Snell described her
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duties as making certain that the permits which were issued
complied with the zoning ordinance.-

She, more than anyone

else, should have been aware at the time the building permit
was issued whether or not said issuance of the permit, would
violate the zoning requirements.

Thus, the first element that,

as was set forth in Celebrity, supra, has been met--an act
which was inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted.
Miss Snell's act of issuing the building permit, especially in
view of her duties, as well as a month later accepting a check
for $312 for a renewal of defendant's beer license and then
seven months revoking the beer license and the commercial
license constituted inconsistent acts.
.
.
As to the second element enumerated in Celebrity, supra,
since these above-ref erred-to agents of the county were aware
of defendant's intent to remodel the home in order to construct
a lounge from which to sell beer and food, then by allowing
defendant to so proceed, created reliance in the mind of defendant Baxter to the point that she expended from between
$12,000 to $15,000 to effect such remodeling.

(T.R. 44)

In meeting the third element, above enumerated, defendant
Baxter has suffered much injury as a result of the inconsistent
positions asserted by plaintiff.

Her injury is that she has

lost the $12,000 to $15,000 in the remodeling, and has lost
an indeterminate amount of business, which has nearly bankrupted defendant, simply because she relied upon Miss Snell's
failure to act as well as any statements made by Miss Snell
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and Mr. Parker at the time the application was accepted, which
would lead defendant to believe that she could proceed in a
manner in which she intended.

A fortiori, Miss Snell said

that she may have told defendant Baxter that she could have a
commercial business in that remodeled home.

(T.R. 55)

Such

a statement by Miss Snell is certainly an act which created
reliance,

justifiably so, by defendant.

Whether or not the above statement was made by Miss Snell
is somewhat immaterial in light of the above-cited passage
from Am Jur 2d.

This is so because that passage refers to

acquiescence once knowledge is acquired.

Miss Snell testified

that she had the requisite knowledge and because part of her
duties were to ensure compliance with the zoning ordinances of
Utah County, her failure to deny the permit or even minimally
to state to defendant that her seeking such permit was in vielation of the zoning ordinances would result in acquiescence.
This principle of acquiescence, as an element in estoppel,
is amplified in the statement of this court in Morgan

~

Board

of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 1976):
"Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his
acts, representations, or admissions, or by
his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable negilgence, induces another . . . to believe certain facts
to exist and that such other . . . acting
with reasonable prudence and diligence,
relies and acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the former (Land Board)
is permitted to deny the existence of such
- facts."
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It has been born out by quoting the trial record above,
that minimally, Miss Snell was silent as to whether or not
defendant was violating any zoning ordinances of Utah County
when she had a duty to speak in the event of a violation.
duty was part of her job as agent for the county.

That

She either

did not speak intentionally or was negligent, but either way
her silence when she ought to speak induced defendant to believe the fact that her building permit and the state of intention to turn said home into a lounge in which beer and food
would be dispensed was in compliance with the existing zoning
ordinances.

Such belief was justifiable under the facts.

Several times throughout the trial, counsel for defendant
urged the court to apply the doctrine of estoppel in favor of
defendant so that an injunction would not issue against defendant.
Since all of the elements enumerated by this court have
been met, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied
in this case, to estop

plaintiffs from revoking defendant's

beer license, her commercial license and obtaining an injunction cgainst defendant.

It would appear that plaintiffs are

guilty of unclean hands; therefore, they should not be allowed
to take advantage of a situation which they themselves created.

-34-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FAVOR
OF PLAINTIFFS IN VIEW OF THE
FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE GUILTY
OF LACHES, DUE TO THE FACT THAT
THE LAPSE OF TIME CREATED RELIANCE BY DEFENDANT WHICH RESULTED
IN INJURY TO DEFENDANT.
It is a well established principle that "equity aids the
vigilant"; so that relief in that tribunal is confined to those
who manifest reasonable diligence in asserting their rights
and demanding equitable protection, and equity will be denied
to those who sleep upon their rights to the prejudice of the
party against whom relief is asked.
Architecture

North Carolina Board of

v. Lee, 264 N.C. 602, 142 S.E.2d 643,650 (1965).

In accord, Wolf Brick Co. u Lonyo, 132 Mich. 162, 93N.W. 251,
252 (1903).
This principle of laches has peculiar force when the injunctive power of the court is invoked.

Laches or inexcusable

delay will not be countenanced when this special form of relief
is sought.

Consequently, remedy by way of injunction should

not be granted in favor of one "who, with full knowledge of
what is being done, or with means of acquiring such knowledge,
is acquiescent, or delays in asserting, or neglects to assert
his rights while the defendant has placed himself in a position
from which he is unable to extricate himself without injury or
damage."

Bacon v. Edwards, 214 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1975) B. Ry. Co.

v. Kirkland, 59 S.E. 220,222 (Ga. 1907).
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"A party is not entitled to an injunction when, with full
knowledge of his rights, he has been guilty of delay and lachesin asserting them and has negligently allowed large expenditures to be made by another party on whom, great injury would
be inflicted by the grant of the injunction."

Kirkland, supra.

In the instant case, plaintiff, represented by Miss Snell, had
full knowledge of her rights, especially in view of the fact
that she was to oversee the granting of permits or licenses
which would not conflict with the zoning ordinances of the
county.

Through Miss Snell, plaintiff has been guilty of delay

and laches in asserting their rights, if any they have, by
waiting from December 1978 until the last part of July 1979
before informing defendant that her operating the lounge in
the building which was once a single family residence, was in
violation of the zoning ordinances, in the county's opinion,
as it applied to nonconforming uses.

Plaintiff county, by this

delay in asserting their alleged rights, knew that defendant
Baxter was making large expenditures in reliance upon the statements and acquiescence of the county.

In fact, the longer the

wait by plaintiff, the more the reliance by defendant.

Then

after this great delay by plaintiff, they inform defendant some
seven months later that her operation is in violation of the
zoning ordinances of Utah County.

Then plaintiff waits an addi-

tional three months before bringing an injunction to force the
closure of defendant's business.

Because of laches, by plain-

tiffs, great injury has been suffered by defendant, especially
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with the granting of the injunction by the trial court.
In Bales~ Duncan,

204 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1974), the court

determined that plaintiff, who had actual knowledge of defendant's plans to convert defendant's residence into a day-care
center, which knowledge came to plaintiff in August of 1972,
was guilty of laches in failing to bring suit to injoin said
use of defendant's home until October 16, 1972, some two
months later, after defendant had expended circa $15,000 on
the project.

On appeal, The Supreme Court of Georgia held

that the finding of laches by plaintiff, hence the denial of
the injunction, was not an abuse of discretion.
The facts in the instant case are very analogous to those
in Bales, supra.

The building permit granting defendant

Baxter the right to modify the home into a lounge, was signed
on November 15, 1978 (T.R. 56) and the check for $312 for the
beer license renewal was dated December 21, 1978.

(T.R. 56)

Yet it was not until July 30, 1979 that defendant received a
letter from plaintiff, Utah County Attorney's Office, informing her that her license for beer could not be issued and returning the previously deposited check.
tiff's Exhibit No. 5)

(T.R. 60,61, plain-

As an aside, in the cormnercial

bankin~

world, a check more than six months old is a stale-dated check
and does not have the same rights of negotiability that a
check which is under six months old has.

That tends to show

that a period of almost seven months is really an unreasonable
period of time in which to inform plaintiff that her rights
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to sell beer have been revoked; especially, in view of the fact
that the longer defendant has waited, the greater the injury
she has suffered.
Plaintiff, therefore, slept on their rights for more than
seven months, during which time defendant expended more than
$12,000 to $15,000 in reliance upon modifying the single family
residence and maintaining the beer license.
plaintiff was aware.

(T.R. 44)

Of these facts,

It would be contrary to equity

and good conscience, to suffer a party to stand by and see
these acts done, which necessarily involve defendant's taking
risks and suffering great expenses and then permit plaintiff
to enforce his rights by injunction and thereby inflict loss
and damages on defendant while defendant is acting in good
faith.
It was inexcusable for plaintiff to wait these seven months
before informing defendant that her beer license could not be
renewed.

If, in fact, defendant was in violation of any zoning

ordinances, this fact should have been readily ascertainable by
plaintiff, especially since they are the ones who enforce the
zoning ordinances.
Further, plaintiff should not have initially misled defendant by accepting her check for $312 for the beer license renewal.

It would be foreseeable that plaintiff could keep that

check for possibly two weeks while ascertaining whether or not
a violation of the zoning ordinances would occur if said beer
license were renewed; however, a wait of seven months denotes
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laches on the part of plaintiff.

A fortiori, by waiting until

November 7, 1979 to file suit to injoin defendant from selling
beer is even a more compelling argument for laches.

"Where

there is inexcusable delay in filing an injunction suit, to
the prejudice of other parties, laches acts as a bar to such
action."

Mansfield Area Citizens Group

v. United States, 413

F.Supp. 810 (D.C. Pa. 1976).
In the instant case, as was before stated, Mr. Parker and
Miss Snell, in their capacity. as agents for Utah County, had
actual knowledge of defendant's intent to use the modified
home as a lounge in which to dispense beer and food.

On page

45 of the trial record, lines 10 to 17, there is related the
fact that defendant Baxter made mention to Ron Parker at the
time that "I would be selling beer out of the property and
that's why the bathrooms and the walk-in cooler, or I've got
closet, should have been cooler, was to be use [sic] and why
it was remodeled this way."
Judy Baxter was then asked if Miss Snell said anything at
that time and defendant replied,

"No, she did not."

In fact,

nowhere in the transcript is there record of Miss Snell ever
informing Judy Baxter that Judy Baxter could not operate her
business there; yet, Miss Snell herself, listed one of her
duties as "making sure that any permits issued are in compliance with the zoning ordinances."

(T.R. 25)

From the transcript it can be ascertained, from a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff knew what the in-
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tended use of the single family residence was, i.e., a lounge
from which beer and food would be dispensed.

Furthermore, Miss

Snell admitted that she may have told defendant Baxter that she
could operate a commercial business there.

(T.R. 55)

The doctrine of laches will be applied in cases where
there is a lapse of time without seeking relief by injunction, to the extent that defendants are injured.

Larreca v. Van

Orden, 346 A.2d 922 (Pa.Commonwealth 1975).

In that case,

plaintiffs waited nine months after the initial announcement
of a project to expand a township building before filing their
complaint seeking to injoin the construction of such project
and where during such period of time, said township retained
and compensated an architect for the purpose of expanding the
township building.

There, the above-cited court ruled that

the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of laches.
The general rule of law in regard to the use of the doctrine of laches in cases where equitable relief is prayed for,
is that the equitable remedy of an injunction must be applied
for with reasonable promptness.

Martin,et.al.

~Adams

County

Area Vocational Technical School Authority, et.al., 313 A.2d
·785 (Pa.Commonwealth 1973); Brandon,

et.al.~

Stover & Pickle,

447 S.W.2d 195 (Ct.App.Tenn. 1969).
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CONCLUSION
It is a very basic and fundamental rule of law that the
evidence deduced at trial must conform to the pleadings and
that those matters plead must be proven at trial in order for
any plaintiffs to receive the relief for which they pray.
Further, in order for a plaintiff to obtain an injunction, it
is absolutely essential and necessary that plaintiffs must
plead and prove necessity and irreparable injury and harm to
themselves.

This is especially essential since the granting

of an injunction, especially in the case at bar, robs defendants of any property rights; consequently, resulting in great
injury to defendants, especially in this instant case.

Atten-

dant thereto, is a compelling constitutional argument, that
to require otherw-ise would deprive defendant of her constitutional rights of due process, wherein she is put on notice by
the pleadings, that she denied each and every allegation in
those pleadings and therefore was taken by surprise when the
very essential element in obtaining an injunction did not have
to be proved in conformity with said pleadings, as was decided
by the trial court.
In the instant case, and contrary to the great weight of
authority, the decree rendered by the trial court did not conform to the pleadings.

As such, the court erred in granting

an injunction in favor of plaintiff.

According to the cases

above cited, that is the law in this state.
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Defendant-appellant did not enlarge the nonconforming use,
which was maintained in the destroyed building, by transferring
said use to the modified home located a few feet away from the
original use.

Defendant-appellant maintained the same type of

business, that of selling beer and selling food, the only difference being that the modified lounge was much smaller and was
located a few feet away from the original nonconforming use.
As was brought out during the trial, that parcel was used to
enhance the original nonconforming use.

Most of the parcel was

taken up in parking and for the home, which was used as a caretaker home for the business, prior to its destruction.

Had

there been no business located there, the home would not have
been built there.

In fact, the move by defendant-appellant to

the modified home conformed to the express requirement of the
Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County wherein it was stated
that "such restoration shall not increase the floor space devoted to the nonconforming use over that which existed at the
time the building became nonconforming."

Certainly 850 square

feet in no way enlarged or increased the floor space devoted
to the original nonconforming use.

The ordinance does not

address itself to the question of whether or not the restored
nonconforming use has to be located on the exact site of the
destroyed nonconforming use.

There is an applicable maxim to

the effect that "that which is not specified is deemed to be
excluded."

That statement speaks for itself.

Another compel-

ling fact is that the people in the neighborhood knew that
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that parcel was used as a place to dispense food and beer,
which is the use for which the parcel had been put to prior
to the destruction.

Nothing had changed except the location.

Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the transfer
of the business of the prior nonconforming use, later destroyed,
to the home, enlarged that nonconforming use, hence is in violation of the zoning ordinances of Utah County.

Such a con-

clusion by the trial court is totally erroneous.
Since the very function of an injunction is to furnish
preventative relief against irreparable injury, it is absolutely essential that a plaintiff must prove irreparable injury in
order to obtain the relief for which they have prayed.
is a fundamental rule of equity.

Such

By failing to dismiss plain-

tiff's complaint at the close of their case in chief, because
they did not of fer any evidence whatsoever to support a showing
of irreparable injury, the court committed error.

Such error

is very prejudicial and has seriously injured defendant-appellant.
The injury complained of must be an actual injury and the
cause must be proven and identified.

It cannot be one that is

fanciful, theoretical, or merely possible, or that is doubtful,
eventual, or contingent.

However, in the instant case, the

above adjectives are inapposite, since plaintiff never offered
one shred of evidence as to any injury.

In addition, plain-

tiffs in their amended complaint allege that defendant's continued operation of the business in the modified home frustrated
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the comprehensive zoning plan of Utah County.

Again, plain-

tiffs failed to put on any evidence to support that allegation
and the trial court committed reversible error in not dismissing plaintiff's case at the conclusion of their evidence,
since they failed to so prove that allegation.

Absent a show-

ing or irreparable injury and harm, an injunction cannot be
granted by the trial court.

Similarly, plaintiffs failed to

·show any necessity for injunctive relief.

Such requirement is

an element which must be proven in order for plaintiffs to receive injunctive relief.

It is noteworthy that in addition to the above, no reasonable probability that real injury would occur to the county if
defendant-appellant continued in her business venture, was in
any way proved by plaintiff.

As is required by the case law

of Utah, the plaintiff in the instant case must not only claim
irreparable injury, but there must also be a showing of some
actual or threatened violation of plaintiff's rights by a
wrongful act of the defendant-appellant.

Since this was not

done, the trial court grievously erred by not dismissing plaintiff's cause of action at the end of their presentation of the
evidence, when urged by defendant's counsel to do so.
Attendant to the necessity of showing irreparable injury
in order to obtain an injunction, a trial court, in granting
an injunction, must not only determine whether or not irreparable injury or harm has been suffered by the party seeking the
injunction, but the trial court must balance the conveniences
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prior to the granting of any injunction.

Because the trial

court in the instant case failed to do so, it again committed
error.

Clearly, by granting the injunction, the trial court

created more mischief and worked a greater injury to defendant
than the wrong whib.h was asked by plaintiff to be redressed.
The injunction has born heavily on the defendant, in that she
is unable to operate her business, after a large expenditure
of money in reliance upon the acts and acquiescence of plaintiff.

This injunction bears heavily on defendant but does not

really benefit plaintiff, since no evidence was offered by
plaintiff to show that plaintiff's inconvenience and injury
are of a pressing character.

In fact, the injury to plain-

tiff was of such a minimal consequence that they did not even
see fit to in any way offer any proof of the existence of any
injury.

Again, it really does not make any difference to

plaintiff whether or not defendant engages in this business
in the modified residence or continued to engage in the business in the original location of the destroyed nonconforming
use.

Nowhere in the record is there any evidence that the

trial court balanced any of the benefits to be realized by
plaintiff against the hardships or burdens to be placed upon
defendant if an injunction was going to be granted.

Such a

balancing has been referred to in many jurisdictions as the
balancing of conveniences.

Such a balancing of conveniences

is such a well established and fundamental rule of law, that
an injunction should not be granted by a court of equity in
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an absence of any balancing of such conveniences.

Because the

trial court did not require the plaintiffs to put on any evidence regarding whether or not they would receive a benefit if
the injunction were granted or whether or not they would suffer
irreparable injury if it were not granted, the trial court's
decision is clearly contrary to the law of this state as well
as the long, well-established authority cited in the Utah cases,
dealing with this very issue.

Therefore, this injunction should

never have been granted by the trial court.
As was stated in Celebrity, supra, the elements which must
be proved in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel
are:

(1) An admission, statement or act inconsistent with the

claim afterwards asserted;

(2) Action by the other party on the

faith of such admission, statement or act; and (3) Injury to
such other party resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act.

All

of these elements are present in the instant case; therefore,
the trial court erred by not invoking the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against plaintiffs.

Plaintiff should have been estopped

from seeking and injunction, because they created the situation
which led to the creation of the circumstance, which in their
minds they felt must be injoined.

Here, there is ample evidence

to show that a public official or officials, acting within their
authority, had knowledge of pertinent facts and then either by
an act or by acquiescence made a commitment and that the defendant, as a result of the act and/or acquiescence has relied to
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his detriment on that comment, act or acquiescence; therefore,
the plaintiffs should not be permitted to revoke the business
and beer license of defendant, since she relied on their acts
and/or inaction.

As was brought out during the trial, plain-

tiff's agents were fully aware of the amount of money defendant-appellant expended in reliance upon Miss Snell and Mr.
Parker's statements.

In fact, Miss Snell even testified that

she could have told defendant-appellant that she could operate
a commercial enterprise, i.e., that of selling beer and food
out of the remodeled home, now a lounge.

For the trial court

not to estop plaintiff from revoking defendant's commercial
and beer licenses, after hearing such evidence, is totally inexcusable; especially, where defendant's counsel urged the
trial court to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.

It is note-

worthy that Miss Snell testified that part of her duties, as
agent for plaintiff, Utah County, was to ensure that any permits and licenses issued were to conform to the presently existing zoning requirements of Utah County.
As was stated in Morgan, supra, by this very court, estoppel
should arise when the plaintiffs, by their acts, representations,
or admissions, or by their silence when they ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces defendant to
believe that her reconstructed business conforms with the zoning
ordinances of Utah County as relating to reconstructed nonconforming uses and since this belief of conformity is justifiable,
a fortiori, even is willing to spend large sums of money, cer-

-47-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tainly plaintiff should be estopped from the revocation and
injunction it sought.
Equally compelling, is the fact that plaintiff waited for
such a long time before informing defendant that her beer license and commercial license had been revoked after seeing the
amount of money defendant spent in reliance on plaintiff's acts.
Certainly the trial court erred in granting the injunction
through plaintiffs since it is obvious that by waiting seven
months to inform defendant of the revocation and an additional
three months before filing suit for injunction, that plaintiffs
had slept on their rights, and because plaintiffs were guilty
of laches and unreasonable delay, the court erred in granting
said injunction.

Plaintiffs had the knowledge and wherewithal

to immediately enforce their rights, did they feei that their
rights would be trammeled by the issuance of the permits and
licenses to defendant.

The periods of time, which the plain-

tiff took in order to enforce their rights, if any existed,
was completely unreasonable and inexcusable.

This is especially

compelling where it is a governmental agency which either intentionally or negligently induced the reliance of defendant.
Therefore, defendant-appellant, urges this court that it
may find that the trial court erred in the points of law, as
enumerated in this brief and

revers~

the granting of the injunc-

tion by the trial court, in favor of the plaintiffs, so that
defendant may again resume her business of dispensing beer and
food in the reconstructed nonconforming use.
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honorable court find that the reconstructed nonconforming use
does not enlarge the destroyed nonconforming use; hence, would
be found to comport to the requirements of the revised zoning
ordinances of Utah County.

Further, that defendant be placed

in the same position that she enjoyed in December 1978, so
that she may in some way recoup the losses she has suffered
as the result of the revocation and injunction imposed upon
her by the trial court, with a finding that the trial court
acted erroneously, so that defendant-appellant may again realize the property right which she has had, which has been deprived her in an unconstitutional manner.

Due to the great

amount of injury suffered by defendant-appellant, defendantappellant respectfully prays that this court will rule that
the injunction was erroneously granted and may further rule
that defendant-appellant be allowed to again resume the selling of beer and food in the home, now modified into a lounge.
Respectfully submitted this
day of November, 1980.
HANSEN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant,
Judy Baxter

by
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APPENDIX
10.02.0700

GENERAL PROVISIONS

02.0701

Intent

The intent of this section is to accumulate provisions applying to
all land and buildings within the unincorporated areas of the county
into one section rather than to repeat them several times.

02.0702

Nonconforming Buildings and Uses

In view of the fact that no further development or change in use
can be undertaken contrary to the provisions of this ordinance, it
is the intent of this ordinance that nonconforming uses shall nor
be increased nor expanded except where a health or safety official,
acting in his offfcial capacity, requires such increase or expansion
Such e~nsion shall be n::.J~-~~ter than that which is required to
comply with the trf:1riimum requirements as set forth by the heal th or
safety official. Nevertheless, a nonconforming building or structuI
or use of land may be continued to the sq..!l1~~_1;:_Eln_La_11 __ s};l_a~cter as
that which legally existed on the effective day of the applicable
regulations. Repairs may also be made to a nonconforming building
or to a building housing a nonconforming use.

A.

Damaged Building may be Restored--A nonconforming bµilding
structure and a building or structure occupied by a noncon_
ing use which is damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, or o
calamity or act of nature may be restored, and the buildin:
structure or us~ of such building, structure, or part ther
may be continued or resumed, provided that such restoratio·
started within a period of one year from the date of destr
tion and is diligently prosecuted to completion. ~ch res
tion shall not increase the floor space devoted to the non
forming use over that which existed at the time the buildi
became nonconf orrnin"i]

B.

Discontinuance or Abandonment--A nonconforming building or
structure or portion thereof or a lot occupied by a noncon
ing use which is, or hereafter becomes, abandoned or is di
tinued for a continuous period of one year or more shall n
thereafter be occupied, except by a use which conforms to
use regulations of the zone in which it is located.

C.

Change to a Conforming Use--Any nonconforming building or
which has been changed to a conforming building or use sha
not thereafter be changed back to a nonconforming use.
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INTERPRETATION

In interpreting and applying this Ordinance, the provisions thereof
shall be held to be the minimum requirements needed to promote the
public health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity, and
general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the county.
Except as specifically provided herein, it is not intended by the
a~~!L.O.L.th-U__.Q~.QJnaJ!f_~_j:o repeal, abr..o_gat...e._annul or in ~nY_~ay_
to .. impail:-..o.L-.in.t:.e.d~~ _:'!i th a~l~~_!-~_t:..!E.8_£!?.Y~.~-!?..?.~.-~ ?,_~ --~aw.#~r . -·
o:~i~ance, .. 9fa'. ..•any t:ul.~~-l-!.~~~'=~-~;'.~E..~F~-~ts_ p_rev.io\lsJY.._ad'(?p,E.Ead
or iss~e_c;l _gr__~~j.-~~-~-~-~-~.J._1Q.~--~cl9l2.~.~~i_~E,- .. ~ssued pursua11._t__ to law
rera-ting to .the__ .§rection, construct;i.ort,... est~blishme~t,\.._moving, -alteration or enl~rgement---oTany·-·b~ilding or improvement ;,.,_no:t:....is,
n-rntended· by tnis~Orainance··c-a~int~~Ter·~ ·with ·o:r··~b·r;;g~te or
annul any easement, covenant or other agreement between parties;
provided, however, that in cases in which this Ordinance imposes a
greater restriction than is imposed or required by other existing
provisions of law or ordinance, then in such case the provisions of
this Ordinance shall govern.
Enacted effective September 9, 1970.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing
upon the Utah County Attorney's Office, Courthouse, Provo,
Utah, 84601 this

day of November, 1980.
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